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Summary Report 
1.0 Introduction 
The NSTS mission STS-27R lifted off from the Kennedy Space Center 
on December 2, 1988, with Orbiter OV-104, Atlantis. Following 
the successful mission, the Atlantis returned to Earth at the 
Dryden Flight Research Facility. While inspecting Atlantis on 
the runway, it was observed that there was substantial Thermal 
Protection System (TPS) tile damage present on the lower right 
fuselage and wing. It was immediately evident that right side 
damage sites were more numerous than on previous flights and 
conversely, there was almost no damage present on Atlantis' left 
side. These unusual conditions led to the Director, NSTS 
establishing a review team to investigate the cause for this tile 
damage. 
1.1 Charter 
The STS-27R, OV-104 TPS Damage Review Team was established by the 
Director, NSTS in his letter of December 9, 1988. (See Appendix 
1). Mr. John Thomas and Mr. Jay Honeycutt were named Chairman 
and Alternate Chairman, respectively. Several team members were 
initially named in the director's letter and others were 
appointed by the chairman to complete the organization. 
The team's responsibilities as delineated in the director's 
letter are as follows: 
a. Determine the cause(s) of the TPS damage to OV-104 
on STS-27R. 
b. Recommend design and/or procedural changes to 
reduce the potential for TPS damage for future f l i g h t s .  
1.2 Approach 
In view of the damage severity and its unusual nature, the team 
chose to treat the review as a full investigation. To carry out 
this investigation, the team membership was established as 
depicted in Figure 1-1 and included representation from program 
management, engineering, operations, and safety, reliability, 
maintainability and quality assurance. It was necessary to fully 
involve and integrate the appropriate element contractors, Martin 
Marietta, Morton Thiokol, Rockwell, and USBI, into all facets of 
the team activities. Inasmuch as one team goal was to minimize 
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the potential impact to STS-29R, many team members were housed in 
a central facility at MSFC to minimize distractions and expedite 
the review process. Similarly, to curtail interruptions in other 
important program work, team and group personnel were deployed at 
the various element contractor facilities to review flight 
hardware pedigree documentation. 
Finally, it was deemed essential that all information, data, 
analyses, tests, and other team products be fully structured and 
documented for future reference. To this end, all team 
supporting data, actions, findings, and recommendations are 
documented in 10 individual volumes as listed in Table 1-1. 
Volume I summarizes the review activities covered in detail in 
volumes I1 through X and documents the damage cause(s), findings, 
and recommendations. 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology employed to search for the damage cause is 
typical of most investigations. (See Figure 1-2.) The team 
began with a detailed inspection of the Atlantis TPS damage, and 
review of related inspection reports to establish an indepth 
anomaly definition. This was followed by an exhaustive data 
review to determine if there existed any common parameters 
between STS-27R and other damaged orbiters. Next, a fault tree 
was developed that comprised all conceivable components or 
conditions that could have led to the severe damage observed. 
There were then many data analyses and tests necessary to clear 
or confirm damage causes identified by the fault tree assessment 
and other sources. These results were used to postulate possible 
failure scenarios that could have resulted in the tile damage. 
Finally, after several iterations through the foregoing 
methodical steps, the failure scenarios were categorized as 
either not possible, possible but not probable, or probable. 
This and other information gained during the review formed the 
basis for the team's findings and recommendations. 
1.4 Organization 
The team members were organized into functional operating groups 
and support groups as shown in Figure 1-3. The functional 
groups--SRM/SRB, ET, Orbiter, Systems, and Launch Operations-- 
were established to coincide with the major fault tree elements. 
The support groups' assignments and tasks cut across all the 
functional groups. A team member was assigned to lead each group 
with responsibility to fully carry out all activities implicit in 
each fault tree element and support area. 
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1.5 Schedule 
The team’s working schedule, Figure 1-4, was oriented to comply 
with the Director, NSTS letter instructing that the team’s 
analyses were required by early January 1989. The first team 
meeting was held on December 9, 1988, and the oral report to the 
Director, NSTS was made, as originally scheduled, on January 23, 
1989. During this period, the team met five times--at MSFC, MAF, 
KSC, JSC, and USBI-KSC, concluding with a telecon on January 20, 
1989. The team also briefed the OSF Management Council and the 
NASA Administrator on January 25, 1989, and February 1, 1989, 
respectively. 
2.0 General Observations 
The Atlantis TPS was inspected at Dryden Flight Research 
Facility, and also after being ferried back to KSC. While it was 
at Dryden, the TPS damage was measured, mapped, and recorded. 
The damage severity and the contrast in right side versus left 
side damage is readily discernible in Figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 
2-4. The inspection results and damage distribution are as 
follows : 
a. Total recorded damage sites were 707, with 644 
occurring on the lower surface. 
b. Total recorded damage sites with any dimension greater 
than one inch were 298, with 272 occurring on the lower surface. 
c. The left side had only two damage sites greater than 
one inch. 
d. The elevon lower surfaces were undamaged. 
e. The right OMS pod had 14 damage sites greater than one 
inch. 
f. The right rudder speed brake had four damage sites 
greater than one inch. 
The inspection also revealed that one complete tile was missing 
(Figure 2-5) from the forward right fuselage over the L-band 
antenna cover. A foreign object, later identified as Marshall 
Sprayable Ablator (MSA)-1 material, was found embedded in a right 
Orbiter Maneuvering System (OMS) pod Advanced Felt Reusable 
Surface Insulation (AFRSI) blanket as shown in Figure 2-6. This 
figure also shows the location of a right OMS pod TPS carrier 
panel that dislodged sometime during flight. 
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The STS-27R crew commented that white material was observed on 
the windshield at various times during ascent. On one occasion, 
the white material hit the window and slid off to the side into 
the frame. Inspection of this area was requested at Dryden, but 
the window had already been cleaned and covered for ferry 
flight. Nevertheless, the remaining residue from this white 
material was retrieved at KSC, and lab analysis showed it to be 
Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) and Scotch Guard from the 
forward RCS nozzle moisture covers. 
During orbiter inspection by the team at KSC, a.small particle 
was discovered lodged between two tiles at the forward right OMS 
pod to fuselage intersection. This was later identified as 
Polymer Development Laboratories (PDL) foam covered with fire 
retardant latex paint. 
The team reviewed the SRB Post Retrieval Inspection Reports 
prepared by the SRB Disassembly Inspection Team to ascertain if 
any debris came from those elements during flight. It was found 
that four small MSA-1 TPS pieces were missing from the left 
forward skirt and two pieces were missing from the right forward 
skirt. There were four small Marshall Trowelable Ablator (MTA)-2 
repair material unbonds on the right frustum. Additionally, 
there were five small SRM Development Flight Instrumentation 
(DFI) cork pieces missing from the left SRM and one piece of cork 
missing from the right SRM center joint. The missing material 
sizes and locations are shown in Table 2-1 and Figure 2-7. 
The Orbiter damage sites and missing hardware are shown in 
Figures 2-8 and 2-9 depicting their relationship to the 
integrated Shuttle vehicle. Also, Figure 2-10 is included to 
depict the STS-27R major flight parameters. 
3.0 Data Review and Correlation 
In anticipation that some parameter, event, or condition present 
on the STS-27R mission might signal the tile damage cause, all 
pertinent factors were compiled and reviewed. The same factors 
from previous flights were compiled and correlated with STS-27R 
to determine any STS-27R uniqueness, or to determine if STS-27R 
and prior heavily damaged flights exhibited any similarities. It 
should be noted that there are certain correlations between 
individual parameters and tile damage; however, these cannot be 
considered independent and absolute because there was no attempt 
to simultaneously correlate multiple parameters with damage. 
This necessitated that additional evaluation be performed to 
judge that correlation's influence on severe tile damage. The 
areas examined are described below. 
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3.1 Previous Orbiter TPS Damage 
The lower surface tile damage inspections from 19 previous 
flights were entered into a computerized data base to facilitate 
assessing the damage sites by several selected attributes. The 
data base was arranged so that the Orbiter's lower surface was 
divided into four areas--forward and aft of main landing gear 
door for both left and right sides. The sites in the areas were 
sorted by total sites, lengths, depths, areas, and volumes. 
Three attributes, total, left/right sides, and those sites with 
any dimension greater than one inch are shown in Figures 3-1, 
3-2, and 3-3. It should be noted the damage on STS-23, 24, 25, 
and 26 is known to have been caused by the ET intertank 
insulation defects stemming from anomalous Silmar resin, and that 
STS-26R damage was attributed to SRM DFI cap cork. A matrix 
correlating STS-XX flight designations with the STS-year/launch 
site/number designation is contained in Appendix 2. 
Examining the various data plots evolved the following 
observations: 
a. History does not reflect that damage is 
preferential to the Orbiter right side even though (a) Most ET 
protuberances are on the right side, and (b) permissible ET ice 
formation is on the right side. 
b. Most Orbiter damage is forward of the main landing 
gear door. 
c. Discounting STS-25, 26 and 27R, the number of 
large impacts appear to be controlled, but the total number of 
impacts are trending upward. 
It is concluded from this data review that STS-27R damage is 
outside the experience data base, but history does not point to 
the damage cause. 
3.2 Missing TPS from S R B  
The TPS missing from STS-27R and 19 previous SRB forward skirt 
and frustum flight sets--nose caps are not recovered--was 
reconstructed. The missing TPS data was tabulated alongside left 
and right side Orbiter tile damage site numbers (see Figure 3-4), 
to ascertain if large SRB TPS loss was accompanied by significant 
tile damage. It was concluded that there is no correlation 
between missing SRB TPS and tile damage. 
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3.3 Statistical Treatment 
The damage data base compiled to correlate previous tile damage, 
paragraph 3.1 above, was utilized to determine if STS-27R was 
within the prior damage population extremes. This statistical 
comparison used the damage attribute where any dimension is 
greater than one inch and was performed for both the Orbiter left 
and right sides. (See Figure 3-5.) 
This assessment showed that the left side average damage has been 
ten sites whereas the right side average damage was just over 
eight sites. It further shows that the STS-27R right side damage 
represents a +50 sigma condition. From this, it is concluded 
that the STS-27R right damage side is not within the population 
which suggests an anomalous cause(s) peculiar to the STS-27R 
flight. 
3.4 Prelaunch and Flight Data 
It was hypothesized that the tile damage cause was related to an 
unusual condition or environment not encountered on previous 
flights, and that this condition or environment would be detected 
by comparing STS-27R relevant prelaunch and flight data 
parameters with those from prior flights. The STS-27R parameters 
examined in detail and used for the comparisons described above 
were derived in part from a complete post-flight trajectory 
reconstruction. This entailed reconstructing the natural 
environment characteristics, the vehicle propulsion systems 
performance, and the vehicle flight mechanics and dynamics 
parameters. The reconstructed trajectory was then used to 
compute vehicle load and heating indicators, and protuberance 
loads. All this was evaluated against flight experience 
envelopes and design limits and no design exceedance was found; 
however, there were two parameters that slightly exceeded 
experience envelopes. 
were slightly beyond those previously experienced in the 20 and 
50 seconds timeframe. Since these parameters were outside the 
experience envelope prior to the time that the tile damage 
occurred, and since they did not introduce excessive loading 
conditions, it was concluded that they were not instrumental in 
causing the severe tile damage. 
The vehicle angle of attack and Beta angle 
The total parameters compared with prior flights are shown in 
Table 3-1 and the data tables, and plots are contained in Volume 
I1 of this report. 
side total damage site correlation with minimum Q Alpha, and some 
correlation between large tile damage sites and Beta at SRB 
separation. (See Figure 3-6.) Even though there appears to be a 
slight correlation between total damage sites and minimum Q 
Alpha, the same is not true for large damage sites. It is 
The comparison revealed only a slight right 
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therefore concluded that Q Alpha was not a potential cause for 
the STS-27R severe damage. It is further concluded that Beta was 
not related to the severe damage cause because it was well within 
design limits, and that if debris had been generated in the SRB 
separation flight regime, analysis shows that it could not have 
damaged the tiles. 
3.5 Ice Team Observations 
It was evident from STS-27R data, observations, and photography 
that the only measurable ice/frost present at liftoff was 
confined to the so-called waived ice areas. Ice team reports and 
photography were reviewed to compare the STS-27R external tank 
ice/frost level with that of previous flights. From this review, 
the ice in each area was subjectively rated with respect to 
STS-27R--less than, same as, more than, and much more than. 
These adjective ratings were then assigned a numerical rating of 
-1, 0, +1, and +2, respectively. Summing the numerical ratings 
for all ice areas on each flight produced numerical, or figure of 
merit, ratings for all flights. A net positive rating for a 
flight means that it had more ice than STS-27R. A net negative 
rating means the opposite. These ratings were overlaid on the 
historical tile damage chart, Figure 3-7, from which the ice and 
tile damage correlation was examined. Unexpectedly, it was 
evident that those flights with more ice returned with fewer and 
less severe damage sites. The contrary was also true, i.e., 
those flights with less ice returned with more tile damage. 
It was concluded from the STS-27R prelaunch ice team inspection 
results and the inverse ice/damage correlation that the severe 
damage was not caused by ice resident on the external tank. 
3.6 Mission Events Timeline 
All observations and data sources were reviewed to extract those 
events possibly related to the TPS damage. The Mission Events 
Timeline begins prior to launch and terminates immediately after 
Main Engine Cutoff (MECO). Included were flight events, flight 
dynamics sequences, crew observations, photographic observations, 
and C-band radar observations. The complete timeline is 
contained in Volume 11, and the significant events were as 
follows: 
a. Numerous photo particle sightings: T + 3, to T + 
2:lO. 
b. Last confirmation of Orbiter TPS integrity: T + 4. 
c. White particles impacting window: T + 27. 
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d. 
e. 
f. 
9- 
h. 
i. 
j. 
k. 
OMS pod carrier panel dislodged: T + 30. 
Last confirmation of SRB-ET TPS integrity: T + 30. 
Three-foot particle/streak in SRB plume: T + 52.47 
First C-band radar object sighted: T + 53.50. 
Outboard elevons to 5 O :  T + 67.8. 
All elevons neutral: T + 84.6. 
SRB separation: T + 126. 
Objects separating from Orbiter/ET (C-band): T + 
~ - 
141 to T + 169. 
3.7 Photographic Observations 
Ascent photographic sources were reviewed in detail to determine 
if debris identification, debris sources, or tile damage could be 
detected. Generally, there were many debris particles/objects 
observed beginning at liftoff with the last one seen at SRB 
separation. Those observed are listed in the Mission Events 
Timeline along with their description and time observed. The 
only two objects tentatively identified were the OMS pod carrier 
panel, approximately T + 30 seconds, and slag from the SRMs at 
SRB separation. Six previous flights' photography were reviewed 
to ascertain if STS-27R particle/objects numbers were unusual. 
(See Figure 3-8.) It was concluded that the total number of 
particles/ objects appearing on STS-27R was not extraordinary; 
but, the time distribution from liftoff through SRB separation 
was different. There is no significance placed on this 
distribution because the severe tile damage occurrence has been 
placed at around T + 85 seconds. 
Several unsuccessful attempts were made to identify SRB forward 
assembly photo or video scenes that could be enlarged or 
enhanced. This could have shown if there was TPS missing from 
the right nose cap. One crew photo containing a distant ET image 
was enlarged and enhanced. The enhancing organization pointed 
out two forward areas that were not as expected. The team 
identified one area as possibly light-reflected off the Gaseous 
Oxygen (GOX) pressurization line, but could not determine any 
reason for unusual color variations. 
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. 
3.8 C-Band Radar Observations 
As the team began its review, there were reports that the Range 
Safety C-band radar had detected objects departing the ET/Orbiter 
following SRB separation. Meetings with Range personnel revealed 
that an object was observed at approximately T + 53 seconds, and 
eleven others appeared between T + 141 and 169 seconds. The 
signal strength was insufficient to be specific about shape, 
size, or possible material, except for possibly object number 
seven. Its physical characteristics may be postulated with 
further analysis. 
The range provided some historical object observations as shown 
in Figure 3-9. The observations were compared to historical tile 
damage and no correlation could be discerned. 
Further, C-band radar analysis and potential for debris 
identification are addressed in this report under Section 5.9. 
3.9 Crew Observations 
The following is a summary of STS-27R flight crew comments 
pertinent to Orbiter TPS damage. 
3.9.1. Between throttle back and throttle up (less 
than Mach 0.95, intercom comment at T + 27), the Commander (CDR) 
noticed pieces of white material hitting windows W-3 and W-1. 
The material behaved like ice/frost and tended to be swept off 
the windows by the flow stream. A residual streak from this 
material was visible on W-1 through orbit and reentry. 
3.9.2. SRB separation was described as "visible flame" 
by the CDR. The CDR recalled only seeing an "orange glow" and 
"lots of smoke" during SRB separation on previous flights (Pilot 
(PLT) on 41-B, CDR on 61-C). During both of the CDR's previous 
missions, SRB separation had occurred in daylight conditions. 
Mission Specialist 1 (MS1) described the SRB separation motor 
burn as longer in duration than he recalled form his previous 
flight (MS1 on 41-D). The separation motor burns looked 
symmetrical to Mission Specialist 2 (MS2). 
3.9.3. All crew members felt a noticeable low 
frequency vibration/buffet during second stage that was not 
present after SRB separation on their previous flights. Crew 
members with previous flight experience described previous 
flights as "electric motor drive" during second stage. This 
included MS2's previous experience on Atlantis. The vibration 
was longitudinal (Orbiter x-axis) at approximately 3-4 Hz, and 
persisted to MECO. 
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3.9.4. At Mach 8.8 (during second stage, approximately 
T + 4:26), MS2 made an intercom comment that more "stuff (white 
material) was coming off the front every once in a while" and 
passing by the windows. 
watched the external tank separation. He was able to see only 
the tip of the tank and did not notice anything peculiar. 
3.9.5. The PLT moved his seat up and forward and 
3.9.6. The crew took photographs of the external tank 
after separation as it was tumbling (approximately T + 26:OO). 
Because of the long range from which these observations were 
made, the crew was unable to make a visual evaluation. 
3.9.7. It was apparent to the crew during the Remote 
Manipulator System (RMS) survey that they had sustained 
considerable damage to the TPS. They noted approximately two 
dozen impact areas on the TPS, some of which covered several 
tiles. They felt that post flight inspection of tile damage 
correlated well with what they had seen during their on-orbit 
survey. 
3.9.8. A review was made of crew flight reports from 
19 previous STS missions. Crew members from five previous 
missions were also interviewed. The focus of this review was to 
compare crew comments from STS-27R with comments from previous 
missions to isolate any unique characteristics of STS-27R. The 
results are as follows: 
a. The STS-27R crew noticed white material 
hitting/passing the window during ascent up to Mach 8.8. This 
has been a common occurrence on previous missions. Pieces of 
this white material have hit the windows in the past and left 
"chalky" stains/streaks. Most of these streaks were "burned off" 
during reentry although some have remained through landing. 
Several crews reported seeing this material during second stage, 
some throughout ascent. Two reports of interest highlighted 
activity at Mach 8.7 and 9.0. On mission 51-F, a large piece of 
this material passed the window at 8.7 Mach. On mission 51-B, 
the highest activity was reported at Mach 9.0. 
b. Two members of the STS-27R crew commented that 
the SRB separation was different than their previous experience. 
(See Crew Observation 3.9.2.) That review brought out several 
SRB separation descriptions that enveloped those by the STS-27R 
crew. This indicates that although the crew noticed differences, 
the STS-27R separation may not have been unique. 
36 
c. The entire STS-27R crew reported a low 
frequency x-axis vibration/buffet of approximately 3-4 Hz during 
second stage. The experienced crew members recalled that second 
stage had been very smooth in their previous missions. Most 
previous flight reports indicated that second stage was very 
smooth. There were, however, two previous missions that 
encountered this vibration. These were STS-13 (41D) and STS-20 
(51C), both with the Orbiter Discovery. These missions did not 
correlate to data of increased tile damage on the Orbiter. 
4.0 Fault Tree Summary 
In parallel with the data review and correlation, a comprehensive 
fault tree was constructed. It contained five major elements 
corresponding to each possible cause contributor, i.e., External 
Tank, SRB/SRM, Orbiter, Systems, and Launch Operations. These 
elements were further expanded until the tree contained over 250 
elements that were subsequently evaluated. (See Volumes 11-VI.) 
A condensed version is depicted in Figure 4-1 that reflects those 
legs that pointed toward damage cause. These fault tree causes 
and those derived from other sources are summarized in Table 
4-1. All these possible causes required some level of analysis 
or test to resolve or confirm. 
5.0 Data Analysis and Tests 
The results established from the Data Review and Correlation 
Section (3.0), and the Fault Tree Section (4.0) necessitated 
further diagnostic analyses and tests. The objectives for these 
activities were either to evaluate data for potential cause 
identification, or to evaluate the Failure Tree causes. Some 
were necessary to absolve the potential cause or to confirm its 
contribution to the STS-27R anomaly. The following sections 
describe the analyses and tests, and relate the results to the 
area under investigation. 
5.1 Laboratory Materials Testing 
Initial inspection of the STS-27R Orbiter damaged tiles revealed 
contaminant and residual debris particulate. These early 
discoveries led to a concerted effort to specifically inspect the 
damaged areas for other possible debris samples. All the 
retrieved samples were subjected to laboratory materials 
analysis, test, and characterization. With this information, 
the material origin on the STS flight elements was established. 
These important evaluations, including the material tests and 
test organization, are presented in detail in Volume VII. 
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Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 summarize the Orbiter locations where 
the debris/residue samples were found, the resulting material 
identifications, and the probable STS vehicle origins for the 
noted material. The most prevalent material found exhibited a 
paint signature. Sixteen of 38 TPS location samples showed 
either Hypalon paint or MSA-1 TPS traces. Although this 
signature, titanium in combination with aluminum, has other 
potential sources on the STS elements (Volume 6.a, Section 
3.2.2.6), those other sources were either found intact during 
STS-27R post flight inspection or did not have a path or 
transport mechanism to the lower Orbiter surface. Therefore, the 
identified probable origin for the noted Hypalon paint debris is 
the SRB RH Nose Cap. Hypalon paint is applied to the SRB forward 
and aft assemblies primarily as moisture protection for the MSA-1 
TPS. Since the aft assemblies are located so that debris 
transport to the Orbiter is not reasonable, and all the forward 
assembly but the Nose Cap was found essentially intact by post 
flight assessment, it has been concluded that the most probable 
origin was the SRB Nose Cap. 
sustaining most severe damage on its right side (Section 2), the 
source is further restricted to the SRB RH Nose Cap. 
Based on the STS-27R Orbiter 
In addition to the noted Hypalon/MSA-1 debris, other signatures 
were found as presented on Table 5-1. The other potentially 
significant debris particle was PDL foam/Fire Retardant Latex 
(FRL) paint. This material was traced to either the External 
Tank "rabbit ears" (located in the ET nose area), or a TPS repair 
in the ET nose area. The final particularly interesting debris 
was the Reaction Control System (RCS) nozzle cover (RTV/butcher 
paper/Scotch Guard) residue found on the Orbiter W-1 window. 
This is not a damage concern but it could be a potential vision 
impairment to the crew. 
5.2 Debris Trajectory Analysis/Damage Flow Regime 
Analyses were conducted to determine the plausibility of 
suspected ET/SRB debris impacting the Orbiter at the observed 
damage locations. The suspected ET debris at that time was the 
Liquid Oxygen (LOX) PAL Ramp and PDL/FRL from the Nose Cap area. 
The SRB Debris analyzed was MSA-1 from the nose cap. Analyses 
were also performed to confirm the reasonableness of these 
impacts causing damage to the Orbiter tiles (i.e., confirm 
sufficient impact energy for incipient damage), and to determine 
the probable flight regime (time) for such an occurrence. The 
tools and techniques contributing to this overall assessment 
were (1) STS launch vehicle wind tunnel oil flow correlations to 
the Orbiter tile damage pattern, (2) debris transport trajectory 
parametric analyses using STS aerodynamic computational fluid 
dynamic codes, (3) candidate debris energy as functions of flight 
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regime and Orbiter station compared with tile damage threshold 
values (to determine damage flight regimes), and (4) Orbiter 
elevon damage vs. position historgram (to assess significance of 
the STS-27R no-elevon-damage post flight condition). 
Figure 5-2 graphically depicts the assessment results leading to 
the most probable flight regime. Based on debris energy 
calculations versus tile damage energy thresholds, it was 
established that SRB Nose Cap debris can damage the Orbiter 
between Mach 0.4 and 3.75, and for ET Nose Cap debris between 
Mach 0.4 and 2.5. It is also shown that between Mach 1.0 and 
2.5, the STS oil flow results correlate well with the Orbiter 
damage pattern. Further, it reflects that the Orbiter inboard 
elevon moves to neutral (i.e., out of the direct flowfield) at 
Mach 2.5. Therefore, since elevon damage history (Figure 5-3) 
shows damage on all flights prior to STS-27R, it is apparent that 
the STS-27R damaging debris event occurred after Mach 2.5. 
It was noted from parametric debris transport analyses that the 
Orbiter tile damage probability increases substantially for 
positive vehicle angles of attack. 
condition exists after Mach 2.25. It is therefore concluded that 
the most likely flight regime where the STS-27R damage occurred 
is in the Mach 2.5 flight regime. 
Figure 5-2 also shows this 
It was confirmed by analyses using the tools and techniques 
discussed above that the suspected ET/SRB debris could reach the 
STS-27R Orbiter damage sites. More detail on this subject is 
contained in Volume 2 (section 3.3). The cases analyzed included 
several ET and SRB TPS debris sizes, and encompassed the Max Q to 
SRB separation flight regime. Results were that all the ET and 
SRB suspect TPS sources do have the capability to reach the 
damaged Orbiter regions with sufficient energy to inflict severe 
damage. 
5.3 MSA-1 Survivability Thru Orbiter Nose Shock 
For the SRB Nose Cap MSA-1 material to damage the t i le ,  a 
relatively large piece must traverse the Orbiter nose aerodynamic 
shock wave. The Orbiter missing tile failure scenario assessment 
(reference Volume IV) established the MSA-1 impacting debris 
size, .25 x 5 x 10 inches, necessary to fracture the tile. An 
assessment was made to determine if this MSA-1 particle size 
could be expected to traverse the Orbiter nose shock and retain 
its structural integrity. 
Debris that traverses the nose shock is subjected to asymmetric 
aerodynamic forces which induce moments, and therefore stresses, 
into the debris. The asymmetric aerodynamic loading due to the 
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differences in the flow field before and after shock wave. These 
stresses are debris size and orientation dependent. A range of 
debris sizes and orientations was evaluated to determine the 
debris survival probabilities. 
Debris passing through the shock wave is exposed to the two 
separate forces, which produce uneven loading or moments about 
the debris center of gravity (CG). Bending moments about the 
debris CG were calculated using a distributed lump mass 
approach. If the bending stresses were greater than 50 percent 
of the allowable MSA-1 tensile strength, a failure was assumed. 
The survival of each debris size for a given orientation was 
calculated using the methodology described above. The survival 
probabilityowas calculated fgr each debris size as a function of 
pitch (0-90 ) and roll (0-90 ) combinations. Figure 5-4 
presents the debris survival probability results versus debris 
planform size. It is noted from these data that a piece of MSA-1 
- 2 5  x 5 x 10 inches has a 70 percent probability of surviving 
transition through the Orbiter nose shock. Therefore, it is 
considered reasonable that this size debris could move from the 
SRB nose area to the Orbiter damage site without losing its 
structural integrity. 
5.4 Missing Tile Failure Scenario 
An assessment to provide the failure scenario and technical 
rationale for the Orbiter missing tile was performed by the 
Orbiter team, and is reported in detail in Volume IV, Action Item 
37 and Appendix J. In summary, it was concluded that failure 
resulted from ascent debris impact which initially caused partial 
tile loss. Subsequent reentry heating led to overheating of the 
remaining tile bondline and its complete loss prior to post 
landing inspection. Thermal reconstructions by analyses show 
compatibility of the noted scenario with the post flight 
condition of the tile cavity and surrounding structure. A 
primary by-product of this assessment was the estimated .25 x 10 
x 5 inches MSA-1 particle size necessary to fracture the tile. 
The estimated size was derived based on empirical correlations 
from tile threshold damage test results. 
5.5 Debris Quantity/Availability Assessment 
A n  assessemnt was conducted to determine if adequate material was 
available in the suspected ET and SRB regions to have caused both 
the missing tile damage and the total STS-27R Orbiter tile 
damages. A s  established in Section 5.4, the estimated debris 
size which was required for the missing tile site was 1 x 5 x 10 
inches assuming PAL ramp material as the cause, and .25 x 5 x 10 
inches assuming MSA-1 as the cause. (See Table 5-2.) Similar 
calculations were made for the 17 largest damage craters with 
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0 
depth greater than 3/4 inch. 
were evaluated by using an averaging technique. 
results are presented in Table 5-2. It was concluded that 
adequate ET PAL ramp material was available to have produced the 
STS-27R damages, and that adequate MSA-1 material was available 
from one SRB Nose Cap (or Nose Cap dome) quadrant. 
The remaining smaller damage sites 
These assessment 
5.6 MSA-1 Humidity Test 
A potential cause identified in the SRB fault tree assessment was 
RH SRB Nose Cap MSA-1 material loss. TPS build records 
evalaution for the STS-27R Nose Caps and five prior flights 
produce some concern with several processing parameters. One was 
the time lapse between the RH SRB Nose Cap MSA-1 spray event and 
the subsequent Hypalon paint application. This hiatus for 
STS-27R RH Nose Cap was 45 days, whereas historical average was 
approximately 15 days. The Hypalon paint's primary function is 
to provide a humidity barrier for the hygroscopic MSA-1 
insulation. The bare MSA-1 exposure to the uncontrolled 
environment in the KSC Vertical Assembly Building could have 
degraded the material. 
Therefore, a MSA-1 strength evaluation test was conducted with 
varied humidity levels prior to Hypalon application. A full 
test report is in Volume 6, Section 3.2.2.4; but in summary, 
MSA-1 strength decreased by 30-40 percent after a 7-day exposure 
to 75 percent humidity. This, in all probability, was a 
contributing factor to the low average acceptance test portapull 
results for the RH Nose Cap, STS-27R average failure strength of 
36 psi versus normal average greater than 100 psi. 
5.7 MSA-1 Blister Test 
The Laboratory Materials Testing, Section 5.1, showed Hypalon 
paint traces on several Orbiter damaged tiles. Prior SRB forward 
assembly post flight assessments have consistently revealed small 
"blistered" MSA-l/Hypalon, some of which were missing post 
flight. Since it has been determined that small MSA-l/Hypalon 
chips can damage Orbiter tiles during ascent (see Volume IV, 
Section 4 and Action Item 32), and, since it was hypothesized 
that these small blistered paint chips could be deposited on the 
Orbiter, a test (Volume VI, Section 3.2.2.6) was conducted to 
evaluate the potential for losing Hypalon blisters during 
ascent. It was determined by thermal vacuum test that Hypalon 
paint blisters as large as 2-inches in diameter can be created 
due to the STS ascent heat load. Although the thermal vacuum 
test did not result in the loss of any Hypalon blisters, the 
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aerodynamic shear force simulation was unconservative, leaving 
open the possibility for blister loss under actual ascent flight 
dynamic pressures. It should be noted that the size blisters 
produced by the test have not been observed during any post- 
flight inspection, nor did MSA-1 humidity test panels blister 
when subjected to the same heating profile. Although the 
assessment concluded that the potential exists for Hypalon 
blisters with MSA-1 attached to damage the Orbiter tiles, it 
exists only for worst case impact angles and velocity and does 
not result in damage characteristics as severe as that exhibited 
by the STS-27R Orbiter. 
5.8 External Tank PAL Ramp Test 
The STS-27R ET as-built records review revealed that an approved 
full length axial repair had been made to the LO2 PAL Ramp. 
This resulted in a unique flight configuration in the critical 
debris zone which had not been validated by test prior to 
flight. On this basis, a test was initiated to demonstrate the 
required ultimate safety factor (reference Volume V, Section 
2.3.3.6, paragraph 8, and Appendix E). 
The flight induced structural loading conditions for the LO2 
ramp established the following two design drivers: (1) 3.0 psi 
BSM plume impingement aerodynamic load which occurs during SRB 
separation, and (2) induced deflections resulting from cryogenic 
temperature LO tank pressure considerations. Since analysis 
for the 3.0 psi impingement pressure established a very large 
predicted safety factor (greater than 21), the only test 
objective undertaken was to verify the PAL ramp structure for the 
deflection condition. 
2 
The deflection condition results in PAL ramp bending along its 
longitudinal axis. This bending is quantified by an equivalent 
bend radius which at the defined limit load condition is 200 
inches. The test subjected the ramp to this limit load condition 
with no apparent structural anomalies. In subsequent 
test-to-failure, the ramp reached a 160 inch radius which 
corresponds to a 1.25 equivalent safety factor. 
Therefore, based on these test results, the PAL ramp repair 
implemented on STS-27R was not deemed a flight debris threat. 
5.9 C-Band Radar Testing 
As described in Section 3.8, STS-27R C-band radar data revealed 
objects departing the STS ascent vehicle both before, and just 
after, SRB separation. It was thought at the time that 
identifying these objects could aid in understanding the cause 
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for tile damage. With full cooperation by the Eastern Test 
Range, action was initiated to characterize the C-band signal 
signature for potential STS debris materials to pursue possible 
object identification. 
Table 5-3 lists the STS debris samples, their sources, and sizes 
provided for C-band characterization. Figure 5-5 presents signal 
strength characterization for 20 of the noted samples overlayed 
with the C-band Radar signal strength range for the STS-27R 
observed objects. The various debris types have been annotated 
to present a qualitative probability-of-detection (high, good, 
low). It was determined that four of the 20 samples tested, at 
the size tested, could not have been the STS-27R objects. Any of 
the remaining samples could potentially have been the source. 
Closer discrimination could not be made because the object signal 
returns were so faint. 
The overall C-band observations significance was established, 
based primarily on the conclusions reached in Section 5.2, Debris 
Trajectory Analysis/Damage Flight Regime. Because the potential 
for damaging the Orbiter tiles by the suspected SRB or ET debris 
sources diminishes rapidly beyond the Mach 3.8 timeframe (Figure 
5-2), it is not likely that the several unidentified C-band 
objects which were observed subsequent to SRB separation (T + 141 
to 169 seconds) contributed to the STS-27R Orbiter tile damage. 
Although the single object observed at T + 53.5 seconds is in 
flight regime of potential damage, it is not consistent with the 
Mach 2.5 most probable flight regime, in particular, the 
no-elevon-damage consideration. 
Therefore, although it was not possible to identify the C-band 
radar observed objects, the established damage flight regime 
rules out their complicity in the severe tile damage. 
5.10 Crew Reported 4 Hz Vibration 
The STS-27R post flight crew comments, Section 3.9, revealed that 
a 4 Hz vibration was experienced throughout the second stage 
burn. The Systems Group reported that this phenomenon has 
occurred on previous flights, but it was noted that the 
phenomenon was stronger on STS-27R than on previous flights. The 
vibration was observed in the flight control system and migrated 
from approximately 3 Hz at SRB separation to approximately 3.8 Hz 
near MECO. 
The vibration amplitude was low, and induced vehicle loads were 
negligible. Each Shuttle element reviewed their structural, 
component, and system certification and concluded that this low 
amplitude could not have dislodged damaging debris. 
The team reviewed this phenomenon with the narrow view as to how 
it might have influenced the potential for debris. There was no 
attempt to assess other ramifications introduced into the Shuttle 
system. 
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5.11 Booster Separation Motor (BSM) Performance 
The crew commented, Section 3.9.2, that the BSM seemed to produce 
"visible flames" rather than an "orange glow" and that they 
seemed to have burned longer. These observations led to the 
suspicion that the BSM performed anomalously and possibly 
dislodged ET insulation that impacted the Orbiter tile. To 
resolve this suspicion, the retrieved BSMs were thoroughly 
inspected and the SRB separation dynamics were examined. 
The BSM inspections, performed at the manufacturer's plant 
(Chemical Systems Division of United Technologies Corporation) 
with NASA's participation, indicated normal performance. This 
was based primarily on examining the residual propellant slivers 
always present after normal firings. An unusual sliver shape is 
indicative of uneven burning as would be the case should 
propellant chunks be dislodged and expelled during the firing. 
The right SRB dynamic performance parameters--roll rate, linear 
acceleration, and acceleration vector--were retrieved and 
compared to those from other right boosters. It was determined 
that the right booster did not exhibit any unusual behavior 
during separation. 
Based on these inspections and the performance evaluation, it is 
concluded that the STS-27R SRB BSMs performed normally. The 
detailed SRB dynamic performance evaluation and BSM post flight 
inspections are presented in Volume 11, Action Item 18, and 
Volume VI, Appendix E, respectively. 
6.0 Failure Scenario 
Several failure scenarios were developed from the fault tree 
potential cause summary and other relevant data. Each scenario 
was evaluated using the data analysis and test results along with 
data coming from the fault tree assessment. The scenarios were 
categorized as not possible, possible but not probable, and 
probable as shown in Figure 6-1. Each scenario is numbered by 
combining the numbers and letters in the lower right corner of 
each logic block. Table 6-1 contains all the failure scenarios, 
their category, and the rationale for their categorization. The 
failure scenario dealing with the OMS pod carrier panel is 
treated alone because it was not a cause for lower surface tile 
damage. Tabulated rationale is provided as to why the scenarios 
were cleared, retained as possible, or listed as most probable. 
Even though the evidence is predominantly circumstantial, the 
MSA-1 from the SRB right Nose Cap is judged the most probable 
cause. 
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7.0 Findings and Recommendations 
The team has completed its assigned responsibilities as reflected 
in Finding Number 1 and Recommendation Number 1 listed below. 
The team has also submitted other findings and recommendations 
that are believed pertinent to minimizing the potential for 
inflight debris. The findings and recommendations are as 
follows : 
Findina 1: 
a. The most probable cause of the severe STS-27R 
Orbiter tile damage is that the ablative insulating material 
covering the RH SRB Nose Cap dislodged and struck the Orbiter 
tile near 85 seconds into flight. 
b. It is possible that debris from other sources, 
including repaired ET insulation and SRM joint cork, caused minor 
tile damage. 
Recommendation 1: Recognizing that the evidence leading to 
the most probable damage cause is predominantly circumstantial 
and that other debris is routinely photographically observed 
beginning at liftoff, it is recommended that: 
a. In the immediate future, equipment, systems, 
procedures, and resources be put in place to gather sufficient 
data to understand the causes for and to propose changes to 
eliminate the damage to the Orbiter TPS. Specifically, this 
effort should include the following: 
(1) A detailed reassessment of the systems design 
criteria influencing potential debris for all elements. 
( 2 )  A review of design and certification 
methodology for all element debris sources. 
(3) Additional testing and/or analysis if 
certification is lacking. 
(4) An increase in photo and television coverage, 
both photo and video cameras should be installed in the Orbiter 
umbilical door area. The use of airborne cameras and cameras 
located in the ET and SRB should be considered. 
(5) Allocation of the necessary resources to 
accelerate refinement of debris transport mechanism analytical 
tools and RI (Orbiter TPS) penetration equations to assist in the 
analyses of future TPS damage. 
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b. Specifically for flight STS-29R, it is recommended 
that: 
(1) Additional TPS plug pull tests be performed 
on the external tank encompassing all possible materials and 
combinations of materials. 
(2) Additional TPS plug pull tests be performed 
on the SRB Nose Caps in the quadrant bounded by the ET and 
Orbiter, on the right Frustum, and on the right Forward Skirt. 
(3) Vent holes be drilled in the SRM field joint 
cork bounding locations of Kevlar band buckles and pin retainer 
band trunnions--the same cork should be inspected for internal 
low density inclusions and repaired where detected. 
(4) Additional cameras be positioned in the crew 
cabin to view the ET and SRBs where permitted by window/position 
field of view. 
(5) A detailed test objective be implemented to 
maneuver the Orbiter to facilitate crew photography of the ET 
after separation. 
(6) Ground based imagery equipment be augmented 
to improve resolution, increase frame rate, increase coverage, 
and record data. 
(7) Assign photography equipped low (2 each) and 
high (1 each) altitude aircraft to view the Space Shuttle during 
ascent for debris particles and sources. 
c. For those flights following STS-29R, it is 
recommended that: 
(1) Those SRB Nose Cap plug pulls performed on 
STS-29R be implemented on all future flights. 
(2) The SRM joint cork be thoroughly inspected 
for low density inclusions before installation. 
(3) The vent holes drilled into the SRM joint 
cork be continued until negated by other design solutions. 
(4) Photographic and video cameras be installed 
in the Orbiter-umbilical well door area. 
(5) The post separation detailed test objective 
for crew photographing the ET be continued through one flight 
that incorporates the requested photographic and video cameras in 
the Orbiter umbilical well door area. 
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(6) Augmented ground based imagery be continued 
through STS-28R (three flights total). 
(7) Photography-equipped aircraft be continued 
through STS-30R. 
Finding 2: It is observed that program emphasis and 
attention to tile damage assessments varies with severity and 
that detailed records could be augmented to ease trend 
maintenance. 
Recommendation 2: It is recommended that the existing 
Shuttle Debris Team be chartered as the Shuttle Debris Assessment 
Team. The team chairman and membership representing each NSTS 
project and materials engineering should be formally appointed by 
the Deputy Director, NSTS Program Office, and provided with 
capabilities to fulfill the following responsibilities. 
a. Perform pre-flight ice/frost assessment. 
b. Perform pre- and post-launch pad debris 
assessments. 
c. Brief Mission Management Team (MMT), Mission Day 1 
(MD-1) on liftoff and ascent debris assessment-inspection, 
photography and radar. 
d. Perform pre- and post-landing runway walkdowns. 
e. Inspect Orbiter at the landing site and specify 
those tile and/or debris samples to be removed for laboratory 
analyses. 
f. Document inspection results on Orbiter tile maps 
and other appropriate tables to include damage site 
characterization. 
g. S i g n  Orbiter ferry CoFR stating acceptability for 
return to launch site. 
h. Perform post-flight SRB debris assessment. 
i. Maintain all TPS damage assessment records. 
j. Provide post mission report to Level I with 
recommendations, if appropriate. 
k. Perform statistical, correlation, and trending 
analyses. 
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1. Perform TPS pre-flight assessment and 
recommendations for upcoming flight. 
m. Document flight readiness rationale. 
Findinq 3: The SRB forward assembly TPS records review 
revealed recording inconsistencies and incomplete data entries. 
There were also some uncontrolled process variables, which in 
hindsight, should have been controlled. 
Recommendation 3: Even though we believe that these 
conditions have been substantially corrected with later 
~ 
documentation improvements, it is recommended that SRM&QA and 
materials engineering witness a complete TPS application cycle to 
ensure that the process is adequate, fully documented, and 
controlled as a critical process. 
Finding 4: The SRB and ET records review revealed a large 
number of TPS repairs. 
Recommendation 4: It is recommended that: 
a. The criteria for repair, rework, and "remove and 
replace" be reassessed with the objective of: 
(1) Eliminating nonessential repair or rework. 
(2) Emphasizing "remove and replace" rather than 
permitting extensive repair and rework. 
(3) Assuring that all processes and procedures 
used to correct discrepant TPS are fully certified by test. 
b. The discrepancy disposition approval process be 
reviewed with the intent of ensuring that: 
(1) The discrepant item receives sufficient 
management visibility prior to closure. 
(2) There is a consistent closure process across 
all program elements. 
dealing with ET/SRB plug pull test location/density for large 
surface thermal protection acreage. The tooling, equipment, and 
procedures also differ among users and these differences appear 
to result in varying test values. 
Finding 5: There are no general standards nor guidelines 
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. 
Recommendation 5: It is recommended that each project in 
concert with the SRM&QA and materials engineering organizations: 
a. Evaluate each type TPS, its usage, standard 
repairs, etc., and provide general guidelines or criteria, if 
possible, for testing application and technique. 
b. Evaluate the tooling, equipment, and procedures 
with the objective of combining the best features of each into 
operator friendly test apparatuses. 
c: Evaluate other methods to verify material and 
process integrity. 
Finding 6: The crew comment regarding the white material 
deposits on the cabin window led directly to determining that it 
emanated from the RCS nozzle covers. It was still present after 
return to KSC even though the window had been cleaned. 
presence of this material on the Orbiter windows could impair 
crew vision during critical mission phases. 
The 
Recommendation 6: It is recommended that: 
a. A short post-launch debrief with the flight crew be 
performed during mission day 1 of each flight. This debrief 
should emphasize out-the-window observations and any perceived 
systems differences. 
b. Alternative designs be pursued to eliminate this 
material from the RCS nozzles. 
Finding 7: There have been adequate analyses and tests of 
the Orbiter windshield glass tolerance to ice and bird strikes. 
There are, however, no such data for other objects such as ET TPS 
resident on the Nose Cap area. Cursory assessment of this latter 
condition did not surface undue concern. 
Recommendation 7: It is recommended that TPS debris 
emanating from the ET Nose Cap area be analyzed for window damage 
potential. 
Finding 8: It is apparent that all Shuttle elements have 
made great progress in eliminating debris sources as evidenced by 
comparing early and recent ascent photography. 
other areas for product improvements that could further reduce 
debris potential, particularly in the External Tank. 
There remains 
Recommendation 8: It is recommended that the program 
actively solicit design improvements directed toward eliminating 
debris sources or minimizing damage potential. 
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Finding 9: The flight heating profile experienced by the 
SRB forward assembly typically is in the range of 40% of the 
design case. Preliminary analyses indicate that reducing the 
heating design conditions to 50 - 70% could potentially result in 
eliminating most external TPS from the SRB forward assembly. 
Recommendation 9: In concert with recommendation l.a, it is 
recommended that the systems design criteria be assessed to 
determine the possibility of reducing the design requirements 
sufficiently to permit a detailed SRB evaluation of eliminating 
external TPS. 
Finding 10: It is the team’s view that there is a general 
lack of awareness on the Orbiter tile susceptibility to damage by 
debris. The same applies to the care and critical nature of the 
Shuttle elements and operations process so necessary to 
minimizing damaging debris. It is essential that all involved 
employees, both Government and contractor, understand that loose 
objects or materials coming off the elements will cause tile 
damage at the speed encountered during ascent. 
Recommendation 10: It is recommended that descriptive 
material, photos, video tape, debris sample and other appropriate 
matter be assembled and provided to the proper organizations for 
dissemination to their employees. It should emphasize that the 
tiles perform outstandingly in their debris-free design 
environment; but are extremely sensitive to any particle damage, 
particularly large debris that could lead to Criticality 1 
conditions. 
8.0 STS-29R Considerations 
The team was requested to participate in the STS-29R Orbiter 
Rollout Review on January 17, 1989, to present any constraints 
derived from the review team activities that would affect mating 
Discovery to the SRB/ET stack. The Rollout Review occurred 
before the team arrived at the most probable TPS damage cause and 
thus each potential cause listed in the Fault Tree Summary, 
Section 4.0, was addressed. 
The STS-29R assessment is summarized in Table 8-1 and is 
formatted to list the failure consideration, its applicability to 
STS-29R, and any special action required. If no special action 
was necessary, the rationale clearing STS-29R was listed. 
The actions for STS-29R dealing with plug pull tests on the ET 
and SRB have been successfully accomplished. The drilling 
operations to vent potential voids under the SRM field joint 
cork, adjacent to Kevlar band buckles and pin retainer band 
trunnions, are complete. The inspections on the same joint cork 
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to detect and repair low density inclusions have also been 
completed. The program is currently evaluating the crew-reported 
4 Hz vibration for a more indepth understanding of its origin and 
potential presence on STS-29R. There is also proper 
documentation in place at KSC requiring that the AFRSI carrier 
panels be inspected for proper fastener configuration. Finally, 
MSFC is updating the appropriate Program Requirements Document 
(PRD) to permit the Range to adjust their C-band radar for better 
object characterization. 
In addition to the special actions, the team also reviewed the 
STS-29R ET and SRB manufacturing records for the debris sources 
in the critical debris zones. This was accomplished by having 
those ET and SRB group members already at the contractor's 
facility reviewing STS-27R records to also review STS-29R and 
present their findjngs to the team. There were no ET concerns 
identified, but the SRB review led to three actions. It was 
learned that the left Frustum was not painted with Hypalon until 
30 days had elapsed following MSA-2 application. Additional plug 
pull tests were performed and the results showed no significant 
strength reduction. The same type tests were also performed on 
either side of a split discovered in the right Forward Skirt 
MSA-2 near the tunnel fairing. The tests showed that the 
surrounding material was acceptable and the split was repaired. 
The remaining action was to check the MSA-2 adhesion to the 
fastener covers on both Frustums. These checks showed good 
adhesion. 
Finally, the team reviewed the new MSA-2 TPS material properties, 
manufacturing process, and certification. It was found that the 
MSA-2 material has increased strength, the manufacturing process 
is superior to that for MSA-1, and the certification program was 
comprehensive and successful. The MSA-2 is superior principally 
because the manufacturing facility is temperature and humidity 
controlled, the tooling is modernized and is monitored and 
controlled automatically, the manufacturing specifications are 
more stringent, and the verification/repair latitude is more 
restrictive. 
Based on this review, and having successfully completed all the 
identified work, the Orbiter TPS Damage Review Team considered 
the STS-29R ET and SRB ready to launch, which was the 
recommendation at the Rollout Review. 
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9.0 Concluding Remarks 
The Orbiter TPS Damage Review Team has fulfilled its assigned 
responsibilities. 
TPS damage is reflected in Finding No. 1; and those recommended 
design and/or procedural changes to reduce potential future 
flight TPS damage are contained in Recommendation No. 1. 
The most probable cause for the OV-104 STS-27R 
Recommended hardware actions have been successfully accomplished: 
thus, the team has no reservation, relative to debris, with 
flying STS-29R. 
The team submits herein other findings and recommendations that 
are considered pertinent to minimizing the potential for inflight 
debris. 
The program is encouraged to continue to devote a high level of 
attention to this important matter. To this end, this team will 
be pleased to examine the STS-29R OV-103 post flight tile 
condition and update its recommendations, if appropriate. 
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1 -776-9-8T 
NSTS LAUNCH INFORMATION 
CORRELATION OF MISSION-DESIGNATOR WITH STS-DESIGNATOR 
LAUNCH 
MISSION STS DATE ORBITER 
41 -A 
41-8 
41-C 
41-D 
41 -G 
51 -A 
51-C 
51-D 
51 -8  
51 -G 
51-F 
51 - I  
51 - J  
61 -A  
61 -8  
61-C 
51-L 
STS-01 
STS-02 
STS-03 
STS-04 
STS-05 
STS-06 
STS-07 
STS-08 
STS-09 
STS-11 
STS-13 
STS-14 
STS-17 
STS-19 
STS-20 
STS-23 
STS-24 
STS-25 
STS-26 
STS-27 
STS-28 
STS-30 
STS-31 
STS-32 
STS-33 
STS-26R 
STS-27R 
0411 2/81 
11 I 1  2/81 
03/22/82 
06/27/82 
11/11/82 
04/04/83 
0611 8/83 
08130183 
11 /28/83 
03/02/84 
04/06/84 
08130/84 
10/05/84 
11 108184 
01 124185 
0411 2185 
04/29/85 
0611 7/85 
07/29/85 
08/27/85 
10103/85 
10/30/85 
11 126185 
01 /I 2186 
01 128186 
09/29/88 
12/02/88 
1 0 2  
1 0 2  
102  
1 0 2  
1 0 2  
099 
099  
099 
1 0 2  
099 
099 
1 0 2  
099 
103  
103  
103  
099 
103 
099 
103 
104  
099 
104  
1 0 2  
099 
103  
1 0 4  
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